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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the risk aspects of a fully phased-in investment-based defined contribution
Social Security plan. Individuals save a fraction of wages in a Personal Retirement Account (PRA)
invested in a 60:40 equity-debt mix and receive a similarly invested variable annuity from age 67. The
value of the portfolio follows a random walk with historic (1946-1995) mean log real return of 5.5
percent and standard deviation of 12.5 percent. We study 10,000 stochastic distributions of this process
for the 80 year experience from 1998 to 2077.
With a nonstochastic 5.5 percent rate of return, individuals could purchase the  future benefits
promised in the current Social Security law ( the “benchmark” level of benefits) by saving 3.1 percent of
earnings, just one-sixth of the payroll tax that Social Security actuaries project will be needed in the
paygo system. A higher saving rate provides a “cushion” that reduces the risk of unacceptably low
benefits. For example, saving 6 percent implies a median annuity at age 67 of 2.1 times the benchmark
benefits and only a 17 percent chance that the annuity is less than the benchmark. In 95 percent of the
potential investment experience the annuity exceeds 61 percent of the benchmark benefit. With a 9
percent saving rate (half of the tax rate required in a pay-as-you-go system), there is only a 6 percent
chance that the annuity is less than the benchmark and in 95 percent of the potential investment
experience the annuity exceeds 92 percent of the benchmark benefit.
We also study a modified plan in which retirees face no risk of receiving less than the benchmark
benefit because the government provides a conditional pension transfer to any retiree whose annuity is
less in any year than the benchmark level of benefits.  With a six percent saving rate, a conditional
transfer is required in only about 40 percent of the simulations.  The expected value of the transfers is
substantially less than the expected incremental corporate tax revenue that results from the Personal
Retirement Account saving.  Additional tax revenue is needed in fewer than one percent of the
simulations. 
In short, a pure defined contribution plan, with a saving rate equal to one third of the long-run
projected payroll tax, invested in a 60:40 equity-debt Personal Retirement Account could provide a
retirement annuity that is likely to be substantially more than the benchmark benefit while exposing the
retiree to relatively little risk that the annuity will be less than the benchmark. Even this risk can be
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*
The rapid aging of the population creates substantial financing problems for existing pay-
as-you-go Social Security programs.  Governments around the world are therefore considering
shifting completely or partially to investment-based defined contribution plans.
1,
2 In such plans,
employees contribute a fraction of their wages to individual accounts, invest the funds in a3See, for example, Aaron (1998), Diamond (1997, 1998).
4There have however been a number of more general discussions about the role of risk in
social security pension systems, including Bohn (1998), Merton (1983), Shiller (1998), and
Smetters (1997, 1997b).
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combination of stocks and bonds, and use the accumulated assets to finance a retirement annuity.
Such prefunded programs offer the prospect of financing future retirement benefits with
substantially smaller sacrifices during working years than the taxes that would be required in 
traditional unfunded pay-as-you-go (“paygo”) programs.  They have the potential disadvantage,
however, of exposing retirees to the uncertainty associated with the variable returns on stocks
and bonds.
Some critics of the proposals to transform Social Security to a system of individually
invested  accounts argue that the reduced financing burden does not justify exposing retirees to
such increased investment risk.
3  They advocate retaining the existing unfunded program or
shifting to a system in which existing defined benefits are financed in part by a government trust
fund invested in stocks and bonds. 
Despite the importance of this issue, there has been no analysis of the magnitude of the
risk to which retirees would be exposed in a system of individual defined contribution accounts.
4
A primary purpose of this paper is to present an explicit estimate of that risk.
In earlier papers on the transition from the existing U.S. system to one that uses
individual defined contribution accounts to finance retirement income, Feldstein and Samwick
(1997, 1998a) suggested that the problem of risk might be dealt with by requiring individuals to
save more than the amount that would be needed to fund the target level of benefits at the
expected rate of return.  The extra saving would provide a margin of safety to compensate for5A conditional pension of this type is not the same as a means tested benefit. Because it
relates only to the shortfall of the defined contribution annuity, it does not penalize other saving
or work after the eligible retirement age. 
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returns that are lower than the expected value. The present paper evaluates the extent to which
such incremental saving can reduce retirees’ risk of inadequate retirement income while still
permitting a lower financing cost during working years than a paygo program with the same
benefits.
The retirees’ risk that the investment-based annuities in a defined contribution system
will be less than the currently promised future Social Security benefits can be eliminated
completely if the government makes up any shortfall with a conditional pension payment funded
with general revenue.
5 This shifts all of the risk of poor investment experience to future taxpayers
while leaving future retirees with the ability to benefit from better investment performance.  A
third purpose of this paper is to study such a conditional pension plan.  We assess the extent of
the risk that future taxpayers would bear in such a program and evaluate the extent to which the
conditional pension benefits could be funded with the additional corporate tax revenue that
would be generated by the increased investment in plant and equipment that would result from
shifting to a defined contribution program.
Section 1 of the paper discusses the basic issues in the choice between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans.  The second section describes the system of personal retirement
accounts and the risk properties of stock and bond investments in such accounts with variable
annuity retirement benefits.  Section 3 then presents our estimates of the risks borne by retirees in
alternative plans with different saving rates.  The fourth section analyzes the conditional pension
program that shifts the risk from retirees to future taxpayers.  Section 5 presents explicit expected4 May 1998
utility calculations of the alternative options. There is a brief concluding section.
The results presented in this paper use the future Social Security benefits promised in
current law (essentially a continuation of current replacement rates) as the benchmark for judging
defined contribution plans.  Our analysis shows that the risk of receiving less than the
“benchmark” level of benefits in a pure defined contribution system would be relatively small at
saving rates that are substantially less than the future paygo tax rate required to fund that level of
benefits.  If these risks are completely shifted to future taxpayers, their required rate of saving-
plus-taxes is also substantially lower than the tax rate required in a paygo defined benefit system.
1. Defined Contributions vs. Defined Benefits
Although the practice of unfunded paygo social security pensions can be traced back to
Bismarck in 1889, it was Samuelson (1958) who first showed the economic properties of such a
system. Samuelson showed how, without any capital investment, individuals can earn an implicit
rate of return on their social security tax payments.  In steady state equilibrium, this implicit rate
of return is equal to the real rate of growth of the social security tax base, i.e., the sum of the
growth rates of the labor force and real wages.
The introduction of a new paygo pension plan provides an immediate windfall to those
who are already retired or who will soon retire because they receive benefits with little or no
previous contributions.  Subsequent increases in benefit-wage ratios financed by increases in tax
rates provide similar windfalls to those who are then retired or soon to be retired.  The U.S.
Social Security system began providing benefits in 1940 and has increased the relative level and
the scope of benefits a number of times. Those who have retired under the existing program have
received quite high implicit rates of return on the taxes that they and their employer paid.6See Board of Trustees (1998).  As recently as 1996, the Social Security actuaries
estimated that the 18 percent rate would not be needed until after 2055.
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When program expansions can no longer provide such windfall gains, the implicit rate of
return of a paygo program eventually decreases to the Samuelsonian rate of growth of aggregate
wages.  For the United States, this has averaged 2.5 percent over the past 30 years.  The rate of
return for any particular birth cohort will vary from the steady state rate in response to changes in
the ratio of retirees to workers caused by changes in labor force participation, birth rates and
death rates, and the ratio of wages to total compensation including fringe benefits.  Caldwell et.
al. (1998) estimate that current Social Security rules imply that the real rate of return on Social
Security contributions will be 2.4 percent for the generation born right after World War II but
only about 1 percent for those born in the 1970s and essentially zero for those born at the end of
the 1990s.
The aging of the population that is now occurring in virtually every country implies that
maintaining the current ratio of benefits to preretirement wages will require substantial increases
in paygo tax rates.  For the United States, the Social Security actuaries estimate that the current
12.4 percent tax rate will have to increase to more than 18 percent by the year 2035 to maintain
the current benefit-wage replacement rates.
6
The combination of the low implied rate of return for current and future taxpayers and the
prospect of a substantial increase in future Social Security tax rates has stimulated the search for
alternatives to the current pay-as-you-go system.  Several countries have already shifted
completely or partially to an investment-based (i.e., prefunded) defined contribution system7Chile was the first of these but it has been followed by other countries including Mexico,
Argentina, Australia, Great Britain  and, more recently, Sweden and China. Feldstein (1998a)
contains essays describing the systems in Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Australia and Great Britain.
On China, see Feldstein (1998b).
8See also Feldstein (1997 and 1998d) and Feldstein and Samwick (1998b).
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based on employer-employee contributions to Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs).
7  In such
plans, individuals invest these assets in stock and bond funds and receive annuity benefits based
on the returns earned in these accounts.  In some countries, the government complements these
annuities with a supplementary defined benefit pension or a minimum unfunded pension.
In the United States, the official 1997 Social Security Advisory Council presented three
alternative plans for Social Security reform, all of which involved some substitution of
investment-based funding for the existing paygo system. More recently, the Congressionally
appointed National Commission on Retirement Policy unanimously recommended that two
percent of payroll taxes be diverted from the Social Security system to individual investment
accounts, offsetting that revenue reduction by reductions in existing paygo benefits.  Several
individual members of Congress have presented plans to use the surpluses in the government
budget that are projected for the next decade to fund such accounts.
8
The fundamental difference between a paygo program and an investment-based program
is that the investment-based system involves an initial reduction of national consumption and a
concurrent increase in the national capital stock.  The rate of return in an investment-based plan
is therefore the marginal product of capital, a number substantially greater than the rate of growth
of aggregate wages. Poterba (1997), using recently revised national income and product account
data, estimates that the marginal product of capital in the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector9Poterba estimates the marginal product of capital by dividing the sum of profits, interest
and capital taxes by the capital stock at replacement cost.  These estimates relate to the domestic
capital stock and corresponding capital income flows.  This method will overstate the national      
gain from incremental saving to the extent that some of the additional saving is invested abroad
or in owner-occupied housing.  It may also understate the marginal product of capital to the
extent that the additional saving is used to finance new expenditures on research and
development that, because of externalities, have a higher national rate of return than investments
in plant and equipment. For a further discussion of these issues, see Feldstein (1998c).
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averaged 8.5  percent between 1959 and 1996.
9  This relatively high rate of return on incremental
capital makes it possible to finance any level of benefits at a much lower cost in an investment-
based program than in a paygo program. Note in particular that it is the overall return on capital
relative to the growth rate of wages that matters and not the return on equity investments relative
to the return on government bonds, as some have suggested (e.g., Aiyagari, 1997).
A simplified calculation will indicate the magnitude of the effect of this difference in
rates of return on the cost of funding retirement benefits.  Assume an overlapping generations
framework in which there are T years between generations.  In the paygo system, individuals 
receive benefits T years after they pay tax; in the investment-based system, individuals spend
their accumulated assets T years after they make the savings deposit.  If the implicit rate of return
in a paygo system is denoted c = n + g where n is the growth rate of the labor force and g is the
rate of growth of average wages, the Samuelson (1958) analysis implies that each dollar of
retirement income at time T requires a tax payment of e−γ T dollars at the contribution date
during the working years.  Similarly, if ρ is the marginal product of capital, each dollar of
retirement income at T requires a contribution to the personal retirement account of e−ρ T at the
contribution date.  The ratio of the PRA contribution to the paygo tax payment to finance the
same benefit T years later is e
 (γ − ρ) Τ.   With γ = 0.025,  ρ = 0.085 and T = 30 years, e
 (γ − ρ) Τ10There are also a number of very important practical issues about the administrative
structure and costs of individual accounts, the supervision of investment mangers, etc. that lie
beyond the scope of this paper. See Shoven (1999).
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= 0.165, i.e., each dollar of tax payment required in a paygo system can be replaced by just 16.5
cents in a funded program with an 8.5 percent rate of return.  The 18 percent future payroll tax
rate projected by the Social Security Administration could in principle be replaced by a funded
program with mandatory contributions equal to 3.0 percent of earnings. 
This comparison of the potential long-run gains from switching to an investment-based
system ignores three important conceptual issues:  (1) financing the transition, (2) the riskiness of
defined benefit and defined contribution plans, and (3) the distributional consequences of shifting
to a defined contribution plan from a defined benefit plan.
10 We now comment briefly on each of
these before turning to a full analysis of the risk issue.
The transition problem is often summarized by the statement that workers in the
transition generation must “pay double” (paying to finance the paygo benefits to existing retirees
while also contributing to the Personal Retirement Accounts that will finance their own
retirement), implying that the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax would rise to more than 24
percent.  Taken literally, this is wrong for two reasons: first, the required PRA contributions are
very much less than the existing paygo tax payments; second, the future paygo tax payments
would gradually decline as new retirees begin to receive PRA annuities and therefore become
less dependent on paygo benefits. Feldstein and Samwick (1997) showed that a gradual transition
from the existing paygo program to a fully funded system could be achieved without raising the
combined total of the paygo tax and the PRA saving deposit by more than 2.0 percent of wages,
i.e., from the 12.4 percent existing payroll tax to a combined total of 14.4 percent of wages in the11Kotlikoff (1996, 1998) examined alternative transition arrangements based on giving
existing retirees and current employees “recognition bonds” with an actuarial value of the future
paygo benefits to which they are currently entitled and showed the consequences of financing the
interest and principal of these “recognition bonds” with different tax structures.
12This investment is equivalent to repaying the national debt implicit in the unfunded
Social Security obligations.  Repaying this debt involves accumulating an equal amount of
national capital stock. 
13We ignore issues of risk here and return to them below.
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first year of the transition and to lower combined rates in future years. Within 20 years, the
combination of the reduced paygo tax and the PRA deposits would be less than the initial 12.4
percent payroll tax.  These calculations, based on the detailed demographic projections and
mortality assumptions of the Social Security Administration, assumed a marginal product of
capital of 9 percent (the historic average before the recent data revision).  But even with a very
much lower 5.5 percent rate of return, the maximum combined total of paygo tax and PRA
contribution was only 15 percent and the cross-over time to a reduced total payment was 28 years
(Feldstein and Samwick, 1998a).
11
The transition from the paygo system to the funded system can be seen as a process of
national investment.  National consumption is reduced (and the capital stock is increased) during
the early decades of the transition (by the higher combination of the paygo tax and the PRA
deposits) in order to achieve a lower cost of funding the same benefits in the more distant
future.
12   Since the retirement income is designed to stay the same in both systems, the present
value depends only on the consumption changes implied by the changes in taxes and PRA
deposits.
13 There is of course no gain in present value if the discount rate used to evaluate the
variations in consumption is the marginal product of capital, i.e., if the discount rate is the same14This appears to be the reason that Murphy and Welch (1998) and Geanakoplos , 
Mitchell and Zeldes (1998) find no net present value gain.
15For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Feldstein (1964, 1996,  and 1998a,
pp. 13-14).
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as the rate of return earned on this “investment.”
14   But in a second best economy in which the
corporate income tax and personal income tax reduce the net rate of return to individuals, the
appropriate net-of-tax rate for discounting changes in consumption is less than the marginal
product of capital.  Moreover, since the reduced consumption affects the current generation of
employees while much of the benefit accrues to the future generations, the appropriate discount
rate for aggregating the consumption changes over  the multi-generation horizon is not a market
based interest rate but a rate that reflects the decline in the marginal utility of consumption as per
capita consumption grows over time.  With expected growth of per capita  consumption of about
one percent a year, any plausible elasticity of the social marginal utility function implies a social
discount rate for consumption that is substantially less than the 8.5 percent marginal product of
capital.
15
This comparison ignores the change in risk associated with the shift from a defined
benefit paygo system to an investment-based defined contribution system.  Both types of system
subject retirees to a risk that benefits will be less than their expected value when the individual
retires.  For a defined benefit program, the risk is that the government will respond to fiscal
pressures by reducing benefits.  This has already happened in the United States in the 1980s
when benefits were first subject to income tax and the future age of retirement was increased. 
Several current legislative proposals would reduce benefits further for some or all current16See McHale (1998) for evidence on the magnitude of the benefit reductions in the
United States and other major industrial countries. 
17The actual extent of redistribution is less than commonly believed; see Boskin, Shoven
and Hurd (1987) and Liebman (1998).
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retirees.
16 The level of the retirement annuity is also uncertain in a pure investment-based
defined-contribution system because it depends on the returns earned on stocks and bonds during
the individual’s lifetime. If the government provides some form of minimum guarantee or risk
sharing, the level of paygo taxes (as well as the reliability of the government’s commitment)
becomes uncertain. For some analysts of Social Security policy, this uncertainty is the
fundamental objection to shifting to an investment-based system of individual accounts.  The
present paper analyzes the magnitude of these risks to retirees and the potential cost to taxpayers
of reducing the retirees’ uncertainty by a conditional supplementary government pension.
A final issue that requires attention in a full analysis of the effects of shifting to an
investment-based system is the effect on the distribution of income among retirees and surviving
dependents.  The current defined benefit system provides a higher ratio of retirement benefits to
past income for low wage workers than for those who have had higher earnings.  This
redistributive effect of the defined benefit pensions, together with the Supplemental Security
Income program, is designed to protect the standard of living in old age of individuals with low
or sporadic lifetime earnings, including widows and divorced individuals.
17   Some preliminary
calculations reported in Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998a) indicate that transfers to prevent
poverty in old age can be achieved in an investment-based system by relatively small  taxes on
accumulated retirement  balances.  Although a much more thorough analysis of this issue is18Kotlikoff et al (1998) have extended the Auerbach-Kotlikoff overlapping generations
model to examine the general equilibrium effects of Social Security reform in an economy with
ten income classes.  See also Huggett and Ventura (1998) for a related general equilibrium
analysis.  Feldstein and Liebman (1999) use detailed long-term panel data to compare the
annuities paid to a variety of income and demographic groups under existing Social Security
defined benefit rules and alternative defined contribution rules. 
19We assume that the assets of individuals who die before retirement remain in the
annuity pool.  On the effect of various bequest rules, see Feldstein and Ranguelova (1999).
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warranted, the subject lies beyond the scope of the current paper.
18
2. An Investment-Based Defined Contribution Plan with Variable Annuity Benefits
This section describes the system of Personal Retirement Accounts in which a
representative individual accumulates assets and uses those assets to purchase a variable rate
annuity at the time of retirement.
19  The representative individual enters the labor force at age 21
and retires at age 67 (if he or she is still alive).  For the sake of concreteness, we use the
economic and demographic projections of the Social Security Administration (Board of Trustees,
1998) for the cohort reaching age 21 in 1998.  We assume that the representative individual has
his birth cohort’s average earnings at each age and experiences the cohort’s age-specific
mortality rates.
In the defined benefit plan specified in the current Social Security law, the individual with
such average earnings experience would receive a benefit at age 67 for himself equal to 40
percent of his immediate preretirement wage.  The full amount of the defined benefit in our
simulations is a multiple of this individual benefit (known as the “primary insurance amount”)
that reflects possible benefits for a spouse or other dependants as well as disability benefits. 
Instead of modeling such additional benefits explicitly, we use a multiple of the individual
benefit such that the implied aggregate Social Security benefits in each year beginning in 2030 is20This ratio is selected to correspond approximately to the debt-equity ratio of U.S.
corporations so that the rate of return on capital at the corporate level can correspond to the
return to these portfolio investments without considerations of the relative yields on debt and
equity. 
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equal to the aggregate benefit projected by the Social Security Administration.  The aggregate
benefits projected in this way together with the aggregate wage income projected by the Social
Security Administration (Board of Trustees, 1998) imply that the tax rate required to pay current
benefits will be 18.4 percent when the cohort that we study retires (in contrast to the current tax
rate of 12.4 percent).  These assumptions about future defined benefits do not affect the projected
behavior of the defined contribution annuities but provide a benchmark for comparing the
relative costs of defined benefit and defined contribution programs.
With a defined contribution plan, the individual contributes a fixed percentage of wages
in each year to a Personal Retirement Account (PRA); we will examine the implications of
different saving rates from 4 percent to 9 percent (i.e., up to half of the long-run paygo tax rate of
18.4 percent).  The individual invests these savings in a portfolio that is continually rebalanced to
maintain 60 percent equities and 40 percent debt.
20  At retirement, these accumulated assets are
used to finance a variable annuity in which annual benefits vary with portfolio performance in a
way described below.
We use the S&P500 index and a Salomon Brothers corporate bond index as proxies for
the stock and bond investments.  Both indices are assumed to follow a geometric random walk
with drift.  This implies that the log returns for each type of asset are serially independent and
identically distributed with given mean and variance.  Thus if pe (s) and pb (s) are the log levels of
the equity and bond indices at time s, we assume21The value of the PRA portfolio is also increased by the annual savings of 2 percent of
the individual’s wage plus the distributed share of the PRA balances of all those members of the
age cohort who die during the previous year; the explicit evolution is shown below.
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pe (s) =   pe (s-1) + µe + ue (s)
and 
pb (s) =   pb (s-1) + µb + ub (s)
where ue ~ iid N (0, σ2
e
 ) and  u b ~ iid N (0, σ2
b
 ).  The covariance between the stock and bond
returns is   σ e b .
With a continuously compounded 60:40 equity-debt portfolio, the log level of the overall
portfolio would satisfy the following random walk if there were no additions or payments:
21
p (s) =   p (s-1) + µ + u (s)
with     u ~ iid N (0, σ2 ).  To derive the values of   µ and σ2 we use the lognormal property of
the returns.
More specifically, if  µ∗ i    is the mean return on asset i in level form, the mean return on
the 60:40 portfolio is the weighted average  µ∗ = 0.6  µe ∗  + 0.4  µb * .  Because we assume the
log returns to be normally distributed, µ∗ i   =  µ i    + .5 σ2
i .   This implies that 
µ + 0.5  σ2      = 0.6 ( µe   + 0.5  σ2
e )   + 0.4 ( µb + 0.5  σ2
b
   )
where 
 σ2 = 0.36 σ2
e   +   0.16 σ2
b
   + 0.48  σ e b. 
From these two equations and the measured mean and variance of the log returns on stocks and
bonds we can derive the log return on the portfolio and the variance of that return.22 The bond rate of return is based on the Salomon Brothers AAA bond returns adjusted
to a more typical corporate bond yield by adding two percentage points.
23The portfolio return is essentially unchanged if we use a longer time period from 1926
to 1997.
24This estimate of the administrative cost may be compared with the cost of about 0.2
percent charged now in indexed equity funds by mutual fund companies like Vanguard and
Fidelity. Bond funds generally have lower administrative charges.
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The CRSP data for the postwar period from 1946 through 1995 imply that for stocks and
bonds the mean real log rates of return were 7.0 percent and 3.3 percent.
22 The corresponding
standard deviations are 16.6 percent for stocks and 10.4 percent for bonds.  The covariance of the
stock and bond returns is  σe b = 0.0081.  Taken together, these parameters imply a logarithmic
rate of return on the 60:40 portfolio of 5.9 percent with a standard deviation of 12.5 percent.
23 
We reduce the mean return from 5.9 percent to 5.5 percent to reflect potential
administrative costs. 
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In the analysis that follows, we recognize that the adjusted mean real log return of 5.5
percent for the portfolio during the period from 1946 through 1995 is only an estimate of the
relevant mean for future years.  Our stochastic simulation therefore uses a two step procedure  to
simulate the uncertain future annual returns.  For each of 10,000 simulations,  we begin by
generating a mean real log return on the portfolio from a normal distribution with a mean of
0.055  and a standard deviation of 0.0175 which is equal to the standard error of the estimated
mean based on the number of years in the sample. We then use this estimated realization of the
mean and the standard deviation of 0.125 to generate a 71 year sequence of portfolio returns from
the year 2000 to 2070.  We repeat this 10,000 times. 





account would evolve during the accumulation years if there were no external additions, in
practice the actual individual PRA account is also augmented by the fraction α of the
individual’s wage and by the distributed share of the PRA balances of those members of the
cohort who die during the year. We simulate this evolution at the level of the birth cohort (rather
than of the individual) by:
M(s) = [ 1 + R (s-1) ] M(s-1) + α w(s) N(s)
where M(s) is the aggregate PRA balance for the cohort as a whole, R(s) is the rate of return in
period s, N(s) is the number of living members of the cohort, w(s) is average wage and α is the
share of wages that are saved and contributed to the PRA accounts.  Since this equation is in
level rather than logarithmic form, the value of 1 +R(s) = exp [r(s)] where r(s) is the logarithmic
rate of return in period s implied by r(s) = p(s) - p (s-1) = µ + u(s).
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2.1 The Variable Annuity
We assume that this same stock-bond portfolio is used to finance the variable annuity
during retirement.  A variable annuity adjusts the annual benefit according to the changes in the
value of the accumulation account.  More specifically, the initial annuity benefit that is paid at
age 67 (on an annuity purchased at age 66) reflects the PRA assets at the beginning of the
individual’s 66
th year, the expected mortality rates at all future ages, and the assumption that the
future return will be equal to the expected log return of 5.5 percent.  No adjustment is needed for
the uncertainty because the individual retiree bears all the risk of fluctuations in the rate of return. 
One year later, the size of the variable annuity payment is increased or decreased from the17 May 1998
initial value in proportion to the change in the market value of the PRA assets relative to the
market value that would have prevailed if the expected 5.5 percent log return had actually
occurred.  A similar revision of the annual annuity payment occurs in each subsequent year. 
To derive the explicit value of the variable annuity, consider the individuals in a
particular birth cohort.  Let the time index coincide with the age of the cohort so that Nt is the
number of individuals alive at age t. Let A66 be the be the value of the PRA assets at the
beginning of the 66
th year and let R be the expected annual real rate of return on the portfolio of
assets used to finance the retirement annuity.  The first annuity benefit is paid at the beginning of
the individual’s 67
th year and annually thereafter. The cost at age 66 of a fixed real annuity of $1
for life (i.e., an annuity that starts with $1 and grows in proportion to the level of consumer
prices) is the actuarial present value (APV) of that dollar with the discount rate equal to the
expected real rate of return on the investment portfolio:
t = 100
   APV = 3     (Nt / N66 ) (1 + R) 
- (t - 66)   
t = 67
where we assume that all individuals alive at age 99 die at the end of the 100
th year. 
Since the PRA account has assets equal to A66 when the annuity is established, the annual
annuity that the individual would receive in the 67
th year is a67 = A66  / APV if the expected return
of R is actually realized in the 66
th year. More generally, if the expected return R is realized in
every future year, the individual would continue to receive that same  annuity and the
accumulated assets at age 66 of all members of that birth cohort would be exhausted when the
last member of the cohort dies at age 100. 
In practice, of course, the actual rate of return varies from year to year.  The annuity
payments are adjusted in proportion to the annual changes in the asset value in such a way that26See Poterba (1997).  These rates of return are not logarithmic. Poterba’s method of
estimation is described in footnote 9 above.
27On the general importance of taking into account the corporate tax revenue that results
from fiscal saving incentives, see Feldstein (1995).
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the birth cohort’s accumulated fund is still exhausted over the 34 year retirement period.  If Rt is
the actual rate of increase of the asset value during year t, the asset value at the beginning of the
cohort’s 67
th year is A66 = A66 (1 +  R66).  The annuity paid in that year is therefore
 a67 = ( A66/ APV) (1 + R66)/(1+R). Similarly the annuity at age 68 reflects the changes in the
market value of the assets during the 66
th and 67
th years:  a67 = a66  (1 + R67/(1+R)= ( A66/ APV)
[(1 + R67)/(1+R)][(1 + R66)/(1+R)].  The last payment to those who are 100 years old is a100 = a99 
(1 + R99)/(1+R). Note that if the rate of return in each period  is equal to the expected rate of
return the annuity remains constant at  a67 . 
2.2 The Role of Corporate Tax Payments
The 5.9 percent rate of return that tax exempt portfolio investors have received during the 
half century ending in 1995 is substantially less than the 8.5 percent marginal product of capital
estimated by Poterba for the year’s 1959 through 1996.
26 The primary reason for the difference is
the corporate taxes on capital and capital income collected by federal, state and local
governments.
27  The national income and product account data analyzed by Poterba imply that
property taxes and corporate profit taxes took 3.4 percentage points of the 8.5 percent pretax rate
of return, leaving a net-of-tax return to capital of 5.1 percent during those years.  The difference
between this 5.1 percent net return to capital at the corporate level and the return earned by
investors in a balanced portfolio of stocks and bonds is due primarily to fluctuations in the ratio
of the market value of stocks and bonds to the reproduction value of  the underlying assets (i.e.,28Some part of the difference may reflect the difference in the periods since Poterba’s
analysis refers to the years since 1959.
29Note that a federal tax of 2.2 percent on a pretax yield of 8.5 percent is a 26 percent
effective tax rate, substantially less than the statutory corporate profits tax rate which is now 35
percent and which has had a higher average during the sample years. The difference reflects the
deduction of state and local property and income taxes in the calculation of federal tax liability
and the combination of depreciation allowances and interest deductions. 
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to fluctuations in Tobin’s q).
28
The funds saved in the Personal Retirement Accounts of a defined contribution Social
Security system should in principle receive the full 8.5 percent marginal product of the
incremental capital that they accumulate.  Making this effective in practice would require the
government to use the additional tax revenues generated by the incremental capital to supplement
the income of the Personal Retirement Accounts.  Although the calculations in Feldstein and
Samwick (1997, 1998a) assumed that the entire incremental tax revenue would be available for
this purpose, it is unlikely that the taxes collected by state and local governments could be used
in this way.  Poterba estimates that of the 3.4 percentage points of tax, 0.9 percent is property tax
and the remaining 2.5 percentage points is corporate profits taxes.  Since state and local
governments have collected about 13 percent of total corporate profits taxes in the postwar
period, the federal corporate profits tax is about 2.2 percent of capital.
29 
In the next section of this paper, we present two sets of calculations:  the first assumes
that the PRAs receive only the net portfolio return with a mean log return of 5.5 percent (i.e., the
historic 5.9 percent portfolio return reduced by an allowance for administrative costs)  while the
second assumes that this return is augmented by federal tax collections of 2.0 percent, raising the
mean log return to 7.5 percent. 30Poterba reports that the ratio of total federal, state and local corporate tax accruals by
nonfinancial corporations to their tangible assets had a mean of 2.87 percent (slightly higher than
the previously noted estimate of  2.5 percent because of small differences in data definitions) and
a standard deviation of 1.03 percent, implying a coefficient of variation of 1.03/2.87 = 0.36. In
contrast, the market stock-bond portfolio had a mean yield of 5.9 percent and a standard
deviation of 12.47 percent, implying a coefficient of variation of 2.26 or more than six times as
large as the coefficient of variation of the tax-capital ratio. 
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The two percentage points  of this 7.5 percent return that correspond to the crediting of
the incremental federal tax receipts is not subject to the same market fluctuations as the portfolio
returns on stocks and bonds. Because the uncertainty of this income is so much less than the
uncertainty of the portfolio income, we treat the incremental two percent as non-stochastic.
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2.3 An Equivalent Riskless Asset
In the next section we analyze the probability distribution of annuity payments associated
with different saving rates and assess the risks to retirees that their benefits would be
unacceptably low.  Before turning to that analysis and the further extensions in section 4, we now
consider a quite different approach (which we reject for reasons discussed below) to evaluating
the defined contribution plan by replacing the uncertain yield on the stock-bond portfolio with a
so-called “equivalent riskless asset.”  
The logic of this approach is as follows: Since individuals hold a riskless asset (Treasury
bills) as well as stocks and bonds in their portfolios, they are indifferent at the margin among
these assets.  The yield on the Treasury bills is therefore equivalent from the individual’s point of
view to the risk-adjusted yield on stocks or bonds.  Instead of studying the risk characteristics of
the higher yielding stock-bond portfolio, why not just replace that risky yield with the yield on
the riskless Treasury bills and evaluate the defined contribution plan using that riskless yield so
that it can be compared directly to the defined benefits of the existing pay-as-you-go plan?31If we wanted to identify a riskless asset for pension investment we would look instead to
the recently created Treasury Inflation Protected Securities in which the promised interest and
principal are stated as real values and the actual payments are indexed to consumer prices.  These
are now available in a variety of maturities up to 30 years.  It is noteworthy that the real interest
rates that they offer are now slightly higher than 3.5 percent, substantially greater than the
implicit yield on Social Security taxes.  Applying a 3.5 percent real interest rate to Personal
Retirement Account savings of a representative individual who is 21 in 1998 shows that the
future Social Security benefits provided in current law could be obtained with a saving rate of
only 7.5 percent of earnings.
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One false presumption in such an analysis is that the defined benefit plan is riskless when,
in fact, current and future retirees face substantial risks that defined benefits will be reduced by
legislation (e.g., postponing the age of retirement) or administrative actions (e.g., changes in the
measurement of the inflation index.)  A further weakness in this approach is the assumption that
Treasury bills are a riskless asset.  Although they are free of default risk and subject to little
market fluctuation, they are a very imperfect asset for a long-term investor concerned with real
retirement income.  The nominal yield on Treasury bills has generally moved with inflation but
not in a way that provides a complete inflation hedge.  Moreover, Treasury bills and similar
assets are often held as a source of liquidity so that the interest rate understates the value to the
holder.
31
More fundamentally, however, we do not believe an “equivalent riskless asset” approach
is suitable for evaluating defined contribution plans because about half of all households do not
hold any stocks or bonds at all.  Feldstein (1996) noted that while this could reflect extreme risk
aversion on their part, a more plausible assumption is that these households do not want to take
the time and effort to learn how to invest in such securities because the size of their financial
assets is too small to justify this “fixed cost” of investment.  Since the majority of households22 May 1998
have financial assets that are less than six months of income even as they approach retirement
age, the prospect of an incremental three or four percentage points of after-tax yield is equivalent
to less than two percent of income.  It is not possible to make any judgement from their observed
behavior about their attitude to the risks involved in an investment-based pension plan.
Similarly, to the extent that retirees are guaranteed a minimum benefit and the risk of a
sub-par portfolio performance is transferred to taxpayers (a plan we discuss in section 4 of this
paper), it is significant that the majority of taxpayers hold little or no stock and bond assets.  The
risk entailed in providing the guarantee to retirees is therefore likely to have a low correlation
with the other income of most taxpayers. Combining this observation with the fact that the
taxpayers’ risk associated with the pension guarantee represents only a very small fraction of
wage income (something we show in section 4) implies that relatively little adjustment for risk is
needed. 
These statements depend of course on the magnitude of the risks that retirees and
taxpayers would face under different arrangements.  We now turn to evaluating those risks.
3. Individual Risk in a Defined Contribution Plan
In this section we assess the risk that an individual will receive an unacceptably low
retirement annuity in  an investment-based defined contribution plan.  More specifically, we
estimate the distribution of annuity values associated with different PRA saving rates and relate
those annuity levels to the benefits currently promised in the Social Security defined benefit
paygo system.  We refer to this level of future benefits promised in current law as the
“benchmark Social Security benefits,” mindful of the fact that these benefits could only be
provided in a paygo system by increasing taxes substantially and that there are many proposals to23 May 1998
reduce actual future benefits. 
We use these calculations to assess the extent to which individuals can reduce the risk of
receiving a low annuity by using a higher saving rate while still saving less than the amount that
would be paid in taxes in a pure paygo system.  The next section shows how the risk of a low
annuity can be eliminated completely by a conditional pension benefit that transfers the risk to
future workers and calculates the extent of the risk that such workers would bear. 
Before examining the implications of the uncertain portfolio returns, it is useful to note
the saving rate that would be required to fund the future benchmark Social Security benefits if the
representative individual received the mean log return of  5.5 percent or the augmented return of 
7.5 percent.  This return is assumed to apply to both the preretirement accumulation and the
retirement annuity.  The annuity is calibrated to correspond not only to the benefit of the
individual retiree but also to include dependents’ benefits and disability benefits in a way that
matches the projected aggregate OASDI  benefits (as described above).  The payroll tax required
to finance these benefits in a pure paygo program is projected to rise to 18.4 percent of earnings
as the ratio of retirees to employees increases. 
In contrast, the savings rate (as a percentage of the same total earnings) that is required to
provide the same benefits in a defined contribution plan does not depend on the future
demographic changes.  With a 5.5 percent log rate of return, the required PRA saving rate is 3.1
percent of earnings.  With a 7.5 percent log rate of return, the benchmark benefits could be
financed by saving just 1.4 percent of earnings.
The variability of portfolio returns implies that saving exactly these amounts will produce
a retirement annuity that may either exceed or fall short of the benchmark Social Security benefit. 32We take the path of earnings to be nonstochastic.  Although there is uncertainty and
variability of the projected cohort earnings, the degree of uncertainty is small relative to the
uncertainty of portfolio returns.
24 May 1998
To assess the probability distribution of annuities in the defined contribution plan, we generate
10,000 simulations of the 80 year sequence of portfolio returns corresponding to the years when
the members of the birth cohort are aged 21 through 100.  For each of these 10,000 time series,
we generate the path of PRA assets and variable annuity payments corresponding to different
saving rates from 4 percent of earnings to 9 percent of earnings.
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Consider, for example, the implication of a mean log return of 5.5 percent, a standard
deviation of 12.5 percent, and a saving rate equal to 4 percent of earnings.  In the 10,000
simulations, the median annuity at age 67 is 41 percent more than the benchmark Social Security
benefit. See column one of Table 1.   In 66 percent of the simulations the annuity at age 67 (a67 )
exceeds the benchmark Social Security benefit.  In the worst 10 percent of the simulations,
however, the annuity is less than 52 percent of the benchmark Social Security benefit.  Because
of this risk of a low annuity, it would be prudent to require that the individual save a higher
fraction of earnings.
Before looking at the implication of increasing the saving rate, consider the
corresponding annuity distributions for older retirees.  The median ratio of the defined
contribution annuity to the benchmark Social Security declines gradually as the cohort ages:  1.41
at age 67, 1.30 at age 77, and 1.22 at age 87.  Similarly, the fraction of times that the annuity
would exceed the benchmark Social Security benefit decreases monotonically with age: from 66
percent at age 67 to 56 percent at age 87.  The annuity level at the tenth percentile also becomes
lower as the cohort ages, declining from 52 percent of the benchmark Social Security benefit at25 May 1998
age 67 to 37 percent of benefits at age 77, 27 percent at age 87.  It is clear from these figures that
it would be desirable to consider a higher saving rate during working years.
Table 1                             
Distribution of the Variable Annuity Payments as a Fraction of Benchmark Social Security 
Benefits Based on Mean Log Return of 5.5 Percent         
                      Age 67                           Age 77                          Age 87       
Cumulative           Saving Rate                   Saving Rate                   Saving Rate    
Probability 0.04     0.06      0.09 0.04    0.06     0.09 0.04    0.06    0.09
       0.01 0.26     0.40      0.59 0.14     0.21    0.32 0.08     0.12     0.18   
       0.02 0.31     0.47      0.71 0.18    0.26     0.40 0.11     0.17     0.25   
       0.05 0.41     0.61      0.92 0.26    0.39     0.59 0.18     0.26     0.40   
       0.10 0.52     0.79      1.18 0.37    0.56     0.84 0.27     0.40     0.60   
       0.20 0.72     1.08      1.62 0.56    0.84     1.26 0.44     0.65     0.98   
       0.30 0.92     1.38      2.08 0.77    1.16     1.74 0.63     0.95     1.43   
       0.40 1.14     1.71      2.57 1.01    1.52     2.28 0.90     1.34     2.01   
       0.50 1.41     2.12      3.18 1.30    1.95     2.93 1.22     1.83     2.74   
       0.60 1.71     2.57      3.86 1.69    2.54     3.80 1.66     2.49     3.74   
       0.70    2.17     3.26      4.89 2.22    3.34     5.00 2.30     3.45     5.18   
       0.80  2.86     4.29      6.43 3.15    4.72     7.08 3.36     5.04     7.56   
       0.90 4.20     6.30      9.44 5.00    7.49   11.24 5.89     8.84   13.26   
       0.95 5.83     8.74    13.11 7.52  11.28   16.92 9.10   13.66   20.49   
       0.98 8.33   12.49    18.73         11.65  17.47   26.21           15.43   23.15   34.72   
       0.99             10.43   15.65    23.48         15.18  22.76   34.15           21.42   32.13   48.20   
Increasing the saving rate to 6 percent achieves a very substantial reduction in the risk of
low benefits as well as an increase in the size of the annuity associated with average portfolio
performance.  The median annuity at age 67 is now 2.12 times the benchmark Social Security
benefit; see column 2 of Table 1.  Since the benchmark benefit for an individual retiree is about
40 percent of preretirement earnings, the mean annuity corresponds to a replacement rate of 85
percent of preretirement earnings.  At the 60
th percentile of the probability distribution, the
annuity is 2.5 times the benchmark Social Security benefit or about 100 percent of preretirement26 May 1998
earnings.  At these and higher annuity levels, retirees might want to make gifts to their children 
or set some funds aside for future bequests.
The six percent saving rate reduces the probability that the annuity at age 67 is less than
the benchmark Social Security benefit to 17 percent.  There is only a 5 percent chance that the
age 67 annuity is less than 61 percent of the benchmark Social Security benefit.
Increasing the saving rate to 9 percent (still less than half of the projected pay-as-you-go
tax rate) raises the distribution of benefits substantially.  There is less than a 10 percent chance
that the benfit is less than 1.1 times the benchmark level and less than a 5 percent chance that it is
less than 92 percent of the benchmark benefit.
This favorable performance continues at older ages.  The median annuity is nearly twice
the benchmark Social Security benefit at age 77, and 1.83 times the benchmark at age 87. The
probability of receiving an annuity that is less than the benchmark benefit remains low, rising
from 17 percent at age 67 to less than 31 percent at 87.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distributions for the ratio of the annuities at age 67 to the
benchmark Social Security benefit for saving rates of four percent, six percent and nine percent.
Similar cumulative distributions of the annuity ratios are shown for four age levels in Table 1. 
In considering these favorable distributions, it is worth emphasizing that the paygo tax
required to finance the benchmark Social Security benefits that are used as the standard of
comparison will rise to more than 18 percent during the next 40  years.   Thus individuals could
achieve much higher expected benefits and face only a very small risk of lower benefits while
saving substantially less than the long-run paygo tax rate.
Although a nine percent saving rate is still less than half of the long-term tax rate required27 May 1998
in the paygo program, such a relatively high saving rate requires reducing consumption during
working years to transfer funds to retirement years when the annuity would be likely to provide a
substantially higher level of income than the individuals had consumed in preretirement years. 
Individuals would probably prefer not to reduce consumption during working years by as much
as 9 percent to transfer funds to a time when the expected marginal value of income was
significantly lower.
An explicit evaluation of these alternative saving rates would depend on individuals’ time
preference as well as their attitudes toward risk.  We do not pursue this further here but turn
instead to an alternative strategy: a conditional tax-financed pension payment to retirees in those
states of nature in which the annuities would otherwise be unacceptably low.  We develop this
approach in the next section of the paper. 
Before looking at the way that such intergenerational risk sharing might work, we present
estimates of the individual risk distribution if the expected rate of log return is increased by the
corporate income tax revenues from 5.5 percent to 7.5 percent. The results for this case are
presented in Figure 2 and Table 2, parallel to those for Figure 1 and Table 1 but with saving rates
of 3 percent, 5 percent and 9 percent. 28 May 1998




















































Personal Retirement Account Annuity at Age 67
Probability Distribution based on a 5.5 Percent Mean Return that 
the Annity Exceeds Specified Multiples of Benchmark Social Security Benefit
at Three Different Saving Rates33It is possible that without such a publicly provided minimum pension guarantee the
private market would develop such a product. While a public program has the advantage that it
can use mandatory intergenerational transfers, the private market could use a series of forward
put options to transfer risk from retirees and employees to a broader population of investors,
including high income individuals, institutions, and foreign investors.  Such a potential market
based system deserves further analysis.
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The results are obviously even more favorable with the 7.5 percent rate of return than
with the 5.5 percent rate of return.  With a six percent saving rate, the median annuity at age 67 is
4.47 times the benchmark Social Security benefits and therefore nearly 180 percent of
preretirement income.  In fewer than 3 percent of the simulations is the annuity less than the
benchmark Social Security benefit.  Only in the one percent of simulations with the least
favorable performance is the annuity less than 72 percent of the benchmark Social Security
benefit.
4. Intergenerational Risk Sharing
The risk that retirees may receive less as a defined contribution annuity than they would
have received from Social Security can be eliminated completely by a relatively low cost
intergenerational government guarantee.
33  In this section, we study a plan in which the
government provides an additional pension financed out of general tax revenue to make up any
deficiency between the benchmark Social Security benefit and the actual defined contribution
annuity.30 May 1998




















































Personal Retirement Account Annuity at Age 67
Probability Distribution Based on 7.5 Percent Mean Return that 
the Annuity Exceeds Specified Multiples of Benchmark Social Security Benefit 
at Three Different Saving Rates34Such a complete guarantee could distort the way that individuals choose to invest their
Personal Retirement Account balances if there is enough of a chance that the guarantee will be
effective.  This might be offset by explicit intergenerational gain and risk sharing and/or by
restrictions on portfolio choice in the PRAs.  Such an explicit gain and risk sharing between
retirees and employees might also be regarded as a more fair distribution of the burden of
uncertainty.  We shall not explore this issue further here.
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Table 2
Distribution of the Variable Annuity Payments as a Fraction of Benchmark Social Security Benefits
Based on Mean Log Return of 7.5 Percent
         Age 67          Age 77                          Age 87
          Cumulative      Saving Rate              Saving Rate     Saving Rate
Probability 0.04      0.06      0.09 0.04      0.06      0.09 0.04      0.06      0.09
      0.01 0.48      0.72      1.09 0.27      0.41      0.61 0.17      0.25      0.38   
      0.02 0.59      0.88      1.32          0.35      0.53      0.79          0.22     0.34       0.50   
      0.05 0.79      1.19      1.79          0.53      0.80      1.20 0.36      0.55      0.82   
        0.10 1.06      1.60      2.39 0.75      1.13      1.69  0.55      0.82      1.23   
      0.20 1.50      2.26      3.38 1.18      1.78      2.66 0.94      1.40      2.10   
      0.30 1.95      2.93      4.39 1.62      2.44      3.65 1.34      2.01      3.01   
      0.40 2.41      3.61      5.41 2.12      3.18      4.77          1.84      2.76      4.14   
 
        0.50 2.98      4.47      6.71 2.76      4.14      6.20 2.54      3.81      5.71   
 
      0.60 3.76      5.64       8.46 3.64      5.46      8.19 3.51     ` 5.27      7.90   
      0.70 4.87      7.30     10.95 4.87      7.31    10.96 4.92      7.38    11.07   
      0.80 6.42      9.63     14.44 6.88    10.32    15.48 7.57    11.36    17.04   
      0.90 9.62    14.43     21.65       11.37    17.06    25.58        13.11    19.67    29.50   
      0.95              13.73    20.59     30.89       17.80    26.70    40.05        22.17    33.26    49.89   
      0.98              21.47    32.21     48.32       28.77    43.16    64.74        37.87    56.80    85.21   
      0.99              27.80    41.70     62.55       41.54    62.32    93.48        58.93    88.40  132.60   
Such an arrangement shifts all of the risk from the retirees to those who are employed.
34  Our
analysis shows that all or most of the cost of the supplementary pensions can (for high enough
PRA saving rates) be financed by the induced additional corporate tax revenue.  A large part of
the transfer thus comes implicitly from the cohorts of retirees themselves.   To the extent that that
induced incremental corporate tax revenue is inadequate, there is a transfer from the general tax
revenue of the employed generation.  This section shows that the resulting risk to employees is35We abstract from the effect of the guarantee on the portfolio choice that individuals
would make by assuming that they must hold this standard 60:40 portfolio.  A practical plan
might allow more choice but provide a more complex form of risk-sharing.  
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quite small.  Moreover, the combination of the amount that individuals save in their PRA
accounts and the amount that they may be called upon to pay to supplement the defined
contribution annuities of all cohorts of retirees is substantially less than the amount that they
would be required to pay in tax in a pure paygo program with the same benefit levels.
Our analysis is again based on the economic and demographic projections of the Social
Security actuaries and the underlying Census Bureau estimates of future birth and death rates. We
assume that the transition to the defined contribution system begins in 1998. The cohort of
individuals who are 21 years old in 1998 does not accrue any paygo benefits but contributes to 
the defined contribution Personal Retirement Accounts throughout its working life.  All
subsequent cohorts also participate exclusively in the defined contribution plan. 
We look ahead to the year 2077 when the individuals who were 21 in 1998 are 100 years
old, the oldest age to which individuals are assumed to survive. This is the first year for which
we have such information from the Social Security actuaries’ projections and also the last year to 
which their data can be extended.  In that year, there are 34 cohorts of retirees ranging in age
from 67 to 100.  The individuals in each cohort experienced the wage growth projected for that
cohort by the Social Security Administration (approximately a one percent annual rate of real
wage increase), saved a specified percentage or their wage income in the PRAs, and invested
those funds in the 60:40 equity-debt portfolio.
35 
We use 10,000 simulations of the return in each year from 1998 to 2077.  All cohorts
experience the same portfolio rate of return in each calender year.  On the basis of these returns,33 May 1998
we calculate the variable annuities of the 34 different cohorts that are retired in the year 2077. 
Cohorts that are close in age have quite similar investment experiences while cohorts that are
further apart in age have less closely correlated investment experiences. 
The 34 retiree cohorts that are alive in 2077 have cohort sizes Nt with t = 67, 68, ... 100.
For each of the 10,000 simulations, we calculate for each cohort the PRA annuity (at ) that
reflects its own investment experience, earnings history, and projected mortality rates.  The
projected benchmark Social Security benefit in that year for each cohort is denoted ssben t .  If the
PRA annuity of a cohort exceeds the  cohort’s projected benchmark Social Security benefits,
there is no transfer.  But if the PRA annuity is less than the benchmark benefit, each member of
the cohort receives a transfer equal to the shortfall: ssben t  - at .
The aggregate transfer in the year 2077 is therefore T = Σ max (0, ssben t   - at ) for t = 67,
68, ... 100.  We summarize the probability distribution of such aggregate transfers in 2077
relative to the aggregate wage income in that year.   If wt is the average wage earned by
individuals at age t for t = 21, 22, ...., 66 and Nt is the corresponding number of workers, the
aggregate wage income in that year is W = Σ wt Nt .  The tax revenue required in 2077 to finance
the aggregate transfer to all retirees with annuity shortfalls is therefore 2 = T/W.  We take the
distribution of 2 to represent the distribution of relative transfers needed in a fully phased-in
system.  Although this transfer is stated as a percentage of wages, part or all of this transfer can
be financed with the corporate income tax revenue generated by the incremental capital in the
PRA accounts (if the accounts themselves are only credited with the 5.5 percent portfolio return.)
To illustrate the distribution of the aggregate cost of the conditional pensions, consider a
specific combination of saving rate and rate of return:  a 4 percent saving rate and 5.5 percent36The conditional transfer is thus a much lower cost way of preventing an inadequate
retirement annuity than the universal flat benefit that is frequently advocated as a complement to
a defined contribution plan.
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mean log portfolio rate of return.  We do 10,000 simulations of the 80 year investment
experience of those over age 20 in the year 2077.  Of these 10,000 simulations, there is a
probability of  0.56 that some transfer to at least one generation of retirees will be needed.   In the
remaining 44 percent of the simulations, the PRA annuities of every retired generation exceed the
benchmark Social Security benefits.
The mean transfer payment among all 10,000 simulations (including the zero transfers
when the annuity exceeds the benchmark) is 3.9 percent of the aggregate wage bill.
36  With a four
percent saving rate and a 5.5 percent mean log portfolio rate of return, the aggregate of the PRA
balances of everyone over age 20 (including the retirees) has an expected value of 5.2 times the
aggregate wage bill.  The corporate income tax of 2.0 percent of these balances implies corporate
tax revenue equal to 10.5 percent of the wage bill.  Thus, on average, the corporate income tax
revenue generated by the PRA accounts is sufficient to finance the transfers needed to keep the
income of retirees at or above the benchmark Social Security benefit (i.e., 3.9 percent of payroll)
and to have a substantial residual left to reduce other taxes or finance other government
spending.
In summary, in the defined contribution plan with a four percent saving rate and an
intergenerational guarantee, the retiree income in a fully phased-in program is on average more
than 40 percent greater than the benchmark Social Security benefit and is never less than the
benchmark Social Security benefit.  The four percent saving rate required to finance these
benefits is less than one fourth of the paygo tax that would be required to finance the benchmark35 May 1998
Social Security benefits. Employees are required to finance any shortfall to guarantee that the
retiree pension income is at least the benchmark Social Security benefit, but on average there is
no tax needed to do this since the extra corporate income tax receipts generated by the additional
capital in the Personal Retirement Accounts is more than enough to pay the expected transfers.
Although the induced corporate income tax is sufficient to finance the average
conditional pension transfers, there are cases in which the employed population would be
required to pay taxes to finance some of the conditional pension transfers. With a 4 percent
saving rate and a 5.5 percent mean log rate of return, the conditional transfers exceed the induced
corporate income tax revenue (10.5 percent of aggregate wages) in only 17 percent of the
simulations, i.e., the amount required to finance the transfers is less than 10.5 percent of wages in
about 83 percent of simulations.   In the least favorable 5 percent of simulations the net revenue
required (in excess of the 10.5 percent from individual corporate taxes) would be 3.7 percent of
aggregate wages, bringing the total of PRA saving and the tax to 7.7 percent of earnings, still less
than half of the projected paygo tax rate.
Although the retirees have no risk of receiving less retirement income than the benchmark
Social Security benefits, they have the opportunity to receive substantially more when the
investment experience is favorable.  Shown in Table 1, median retirement income at age 67 of
the cohort that was 21 in 1998 with the 4 percent saving rate is 1.41 times the benchmark Social
Security benefits. In the most favorable 20 percent of the simulations, the annuity exceeds 2.9
times the benchmark Social Security benefit. 
Table 3 summarizes the key results of the pension guarantee plan. Column 1 shows, for
the saving rate of 4 percent, the cumulative probability distribution of the required transfers as a36 May 1998
percentage of the aggregate wage income at the time. In more than 40 percent of the simulations,
 no transfer is required.  In 80 percent, the transfer is less than 9.6 percent of payroll.  Column 2
presents the same transfers net of the incremental corporate tax revenue associated with the PRA
capital.  These figures differ from the figures in column 1 by 10.5 percent of wages, the mean
incremental corporate tax revenue.  Column 3 shows the cumulative distribution of the retiree
income of the cohort that was 21 in 1998 as a multiple of the benchmark Social Security benefit. 
The retiree income is equal to the benchmark in those cases reported as 1.00.  Beyond that, the
annuity exceeds the benchmark and the guarantee is irrelevant. 
These three distributions are repeated in columns 4 through 9 for saving rates of 6 percent
and 9 percent.  Note that with a 6 percent saving rate the incremental corporate tax is 15.7
percent of covered earnings while in the 9 percent case it is 23.6 percent of earnings.  With a 6
and 9 percent saving rates, the incremental corporate income tax is sufficient to finance the
required transfer in more than 99 percent of simulations.
A final word of caution is appropriate.  The ability to shift risk from retirees to taxpayers
with the type of conditional guarantee analyzed in this section assumes that taxpayers would be
willing to tax themselves when necessary.  A risk averse individual who fears that future
taxpayers might not be willing to do so might prefer to make his own provision by a high rate of
saving, as indicated in the previous section. 
5. A CRRA Expected Utility Evaluation
Although we believe that displaying the probability distributions of possible outcomes, as
we do in Tables 1, 2 and 3, is the best way to indicate the risks and rewards of the alternative
investment-based options, in this section we present explicit summary calculations based on37 May 1998
expected values of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions.  
To evaluate the PRA options presented in Table 1, we consider a representative individual with
expected utility function E = E [ Σ  pt β 
t-21 u (Ct ) ] where the summation is from t = 21 to t = 100
and u ( Ct  ) = ( Ct 
1−γ - 1)/ (1 - γ).  Ηere   E is the expectation operator,  pt  is the probability of
surviving to age t from age 21,  β is the time discount factor at which utility is discounted, and γ
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  We do the analysis with a time discount factor of 0.98;
alternative calculations with a greater time discount (β = 0.96) and with no time discount factor
(β  = 1) have very little effect on the results that we report below. 38 May 1998
Table 3                            
Distribution of Taxpayer Payments and Retirement Incomes in an Investment-Based Defined
Contribution Plan with Conditional Pension Transfers              
         0.04     0.06 0.09
Cumulative         Net      Net    Net
Probability Transfer     Transfer     Benefit     Transfer      Transfer     Benefit     Transfer     Transfer     Benefit 
 
    0.01       0.00       -10.5         2085 0.00     -15.7       3475          0.00 -23.6    6255   
    0.02  0.00            -10.5         1611 0.00     -15.7       2684          0.00 -23.6    4832   
    0.05  0.00       -10.5         1030 0.00     -15.7       1716          0.00 -23.6    3089   
    0.10  0.00       -10.5           722 0.00     -15.7       1203          0.00 -23.6    2165   
    0.20  0.00       -10.5           481 0.00     -15.7          802          0.00            -23.6         1444   
    0.30  0.00       -10.5           365 0.00     -15.7          608          0.00 -23.6         1095   
    0.40  0.00       -10.5           282 0.00     -15.7          470          0.00            -23.6           846   
    
    0.50  0.27       -10.2           224 0.00     -15.7          373          0.00 -23.6      671   
    
    0.60                2.63         -7.8           180 0.03     -15.7         301          0.00 -23.6      541   
    0.70 6.27         -4.2           146 1.16     -14.5          244          0.00 -23.6      439   
    0.80 9.59         -0.9           113 4.97     -10.7         188          0.82 -22.8      338   
    0.90              12.60          2.1           100 9.47       -6.2         133          4.87 -18.7      239   
    0.95              14.22          3.7           100          11.90       -3.8          100          8.43 -15.1      179   
    0.98              15.56          5.1           100          13.91       -1.8         100        11.44 -12.1      132   
    0.99              16.19          5.7           100          14.85       -0.9          100        12.85 -10.7           109   
We recognize the restrictive nature of this specification.  The function is additively
separable and the relative risk aversion in each period,   - u”c/u’ = γ , is a constant and is
independent of age.  Despite these limitations, these calculations may be useful to some readers
as a supplement to the direct information of Table 1.
We evaluate this function for a representative agent who is age 21 in 1998.  The
individual earns the age specific wage for this cohort projected by the Social Security actuaries
and pays a proportional income tax equal to 20 percent of that wage.  With a 6 percent rate of
PRA saving, the net income during the working years from age 21 to age 66 is 74 percent of the37This represents a simplification in several ways.  Although we are looking at wages for
the years beginning in 1998, we are ignoring the transition problem and comparing a fully phased
in PRA system with the paygo system that would also exist in the more distant future.  We do
this to avoid the complexities of modeling the transition.  We also simplify by treating the
projected wages as the marginal product of capital from which all taxes and saving are
subtracted. 
38The lack of other saving reduces the individual’s level of retirement consumption and
therefore makes the individual’s utility more sensitive to fluctuations in the return to PRA
saving. 
39We also present some results that focus exclusively on the income during retirement,
abstracting from the difference between the 18 percent tax in preretirement years and the lower
PRA saving rate.
40See for example Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Kocherlakota (1996). The difference
between the equity yield and the yield on Treasury bills has of course declined in recent years,
implying a lower measure of risk aversion.  If the “riskless” security is taken to be an asset with
no credit risk and with a guaranteed long-term real return, the comparison should be the recently
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gross wage.
37  The individual is assumed to do no other saving, making the consumption in each
preretirement year the same 74 percent of pretax wages.
38    During retirement the individual’s
consumption is the variable annuity that is generated by the PRA savings, as described in section
2.1 above. Similar simulations are done also for PRA plans with saving rates of 4 percent and 9
percent.  We contrast each of these to the paygo system in which the tax rate is 18 percent ,
making the net consumption during the preretirement years equal to 62 percent of preretirement
income.  This paygo system is assumed to provide the benchmark level of benefits prescribed in
current law during each retirement year with no uncertainty.
39
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is the key parameter in this expected utility
evaluation. The values of γ inferred in the finance literature from the difference between the
yields on stocks and on “risk free” treasury bills are implausibly high, giving rise to the label
“equity premium puzzle.”
40  Instead of using these implausibly high values as a guide to policy,created Treasury Inflation Protected Securities.  These TIPS now have a yield of about 3.6
percent, not that different from the earnings-price ratio on equities.
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we use the following mental experiment to help decide on appropriate CRRA values.  
The representative individual in our example will reach age 67 in the year 2044 and will
be retired during the decades that follow. The level of retirement consumption that the PRA will
provide at that time might be conservatively approximated to be $40,000 in today’s prices; the
precise level does not matter for our example.  Consider two equally probable states of nature. In
the good state the retiree has income and consumption of $40,000.  In the bad state, it is only
$20,000.  In the mental experiment, we give the individual the opportunity to increase
consumption in the bad state by one dollar by agreeing to reduce consumption if the good state
occurs.   We can infer the individual’s CRRA γ coefficient by observing how much the
individual would be willing to give up in the good state to increase consumption in the bad state
by one dollar.
Any risk averse individual ( γ  > 0) would be willing to give up more than a dollar in the
good state for a dollar in the bad state.  If the individual would give up two dollars in the good
state, but no more, to increase consumption in the bad state by one dollar, we infer that
u  (20,000) = 2 u’(40,000).  Since the CRRA form noted above implies u’(c) = C
 − γ , the
condition that u’ (20,000) = 2 u’(40,000) implies that 2 γ  = 2 or  γ = 1.
Similarly, we can infer that if the representative individual is willing to give up four
dollars of consumption in the good state (when consumption would otherwise be $40,000) to
have an additional dollar of consumption in the bad state when consumption would otherwise be
$20,000, the coefficient of CRRA becomes  γ  = 2.  And a representative individual who would41 May 1998
give up eight dollars in the good state to have one extra dollar in the bad state has a CRRA value
of   γ  = 3.   
Readers can decide for themselves how much is reasonable to assume that someone
would give up when income is $40,000 for a dollar when the income would otherwise be
$20,000.  Without choosing a specific value, we believe that  the plausible sacrifice amount
would be less than eight dollars and probably less than four dollars.
We drew 10,000 independent histories of the 80 year sequence (from age 21 in 1998 to
age 100 in 2077) of returns on the PRA savings of the representative individual and calculated
the expected utility value associate with each value of  γ .  Our calculations show that the PRA 
with a 6 percent mandatory saving rate is preferable to the paygo for the relative risk aversion
coefficient up to  γ  = 3.4.  With a 4 percent saving rate the critical value of  γ   is 2.95 while with
a 9 percent saving rate the PRA system is preferred to paygo for all values of  γ less than 3.85.
The comparison of the expected lifetime utilities of the PRA and the paygo systems
reflects time preference as well as risk preference.  During the individuals’ working years, the
paygo requires an 18 percent tax while the PRA only involves a saving rate of between 4 percent
and 9 percent. Differences in time preference (β in our analysis) therefore influence the relative
desirability of the two options.  To abstract from this and focus just on the difference between the
presumed-certain paygo benefit and the stochastic PRA annuity, we apply the expected utility
calculation just to the incomes in the retirement years.  In other words, we disregard the PRA
system’s advantage of requiring much lower contributions during working years than the 18
percent paygo tax. With a saving rate of 6 percent, we note that the median PRA annuity is42 May 1998
substantially greater than the benchmark benefit; table 1 shows that the median PRA annuity at
age 67 is 2.12 times the benchmark benefit. Although there is a 17 percent chance that the PRA
annuity will fall below the benchmark benefit at age 67 (and a greater chance at higher ages), the
explicit utility evaluation starting at age 67 shows that the stochastic  PRA annuity is preferred to
the “certain” paygo benefit for all CRRA coefficients up to 2.4.  With a four percent saving rate
this critical value of γ becomes 1.6 while with a saving rate of 9 percent the PRA option is
preferred for all values of γ up to 3.1. In short, for plausible CRRA risk aversion parameters, the
preference for the PRA option does not depend on the lower contribution during the working
years.
5.1 Evaluating Government Guarantee Plans with CRRA Expected Utility
When we turn from the pure individualistic PRA system to one with a government
guarantee, we can no longer focus on a single age cohort but must consider the benefits received
by all retirees aged 67 through 100 and the taxes paid by employees of all ages (as we do in Table
3).  We therefore examine the situation during a representative year after the PRA system is fully
phased in.  We compare the possible outcomes of the PRA system (for alternative possible
saving rates) with the paygo system in the long-run with an 18 percent tax rate. 
More specifically, we calculate the expected value of a social welfare function in the first
year in which the PRA system is fully phased in.  This is the year 2077 when the youngest
workers in 1998 (those who are then 21 years old) have reached 100, the oldest age that we
consider in our analysis. The value of the social welfare function in that year is the sum of the
expected utilities of the employed taxpayers and the retirees: SWF = E [ Σ  Νj  u(Cj ) ] where the
summation is now over the 80 cohorts identified by age (from j = 21 to j = 100),   E is again the41This expected social welfare function value for a single year is of course different from
the expected lifetime utility that we used to evaluate the choice between PRA and paygo plans.  It
would be desirable to use a framework in which for each of the 80 cohorts we evaluated the
expected present value of lifetime utility.  Unfortunately, the data requirements for that
calculation stretch further into the future than the projections of the Social Security actuaries and
the Census bureau.
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expectations operator,   Νj   is the number of individuals in cohort j in the year 2077, and u (Cj )
is the utility of the consumption of the representative individual in cohort j in that year.  The form
of the utility function is the same CRRA function specified above.  In each of the 10,000
simulations that we do, we simulate the PRA accumulation of each cohort over the 80 year
horizon from 1998 until 2077 and then calculate the associated  PRA annuity in that year for each
retiree cohort. We then specify that the individuals in each retiree cohort consume the greater of
the benchmark benefit and the PRA annuity of that cohort in that year.
41 
Retirees thus face no risk of consuming less than the benchmark benefit.  All of the
potential adverse uncertainty is focused on the taxpayers who must pay an uncertain tax bill.  In
particular, with a 6 percent mandatory saving rate and a 20 percent income tax, the consumption
of workers in cohort j is 74 percent  of the cohort specific wage unless they are called upon to
pay a supplementary tax to fill the gap between a low PRA annuity and the benchmark benefit. 
As we noted above, the first source of revenue to fill this gap would be the incremental corporate
tax revenue that results from the PRA capital.  In  approximately 15 percent of the outcomes with
the 4 percent saving rate, it is necessary for the employees to pay a supplementary tax, reducing
their consumption.  In our analysis we assume that employees make annual adjustments to their
consumption when needed to fill the retiree income gap even though some form of smoothing
behavior would reduce the adverse utility effects of these uncertain extra tax burdens. 44 May 1998
We contrast this PRA evaluation with a fully mature non-stochastic paygo system with an
18 percent tax (reducing consumption in working years to 62 percent of the pretax wage) and
with the benchmark benefits during retirement. We find that the PRA system with the
government guarantee dominates the paygo system for each of the three saving rates (4 percent, 6
percent and 9 percent) and for every CRRA parameter value the we considered (up to ( = 40). 
These simulations tell us that a CRRA individual with any degree of risk aversion that we have
considered would prefer the PRA system with government guarantees to the current paygo
system.
We can also use this framework to compare the expected utility in a representative year of
the PRA plans with and without government guarantees.  Although retirees obviously prefer the
guarantee, it is not clear ex ante which will be preferred when the expected utilities of all cohorts
of workers and retirees are taken into account. Our analysis shows that for each saving rate
between four percent and nine percent the guarantee is preferred for individuals with all of the
risk aversion coefficients that we have considered (up to ( = 40).  
At this point our earlier warning about the risk of government promises is worth
repeating.  These calculations assume that the paygo system and the government guarantee have
no risk when in fact there is the risk that the taxpayers will not provide the benefits called for by
either system. Individuals who regard the government payment as sufficiently risky might prefer
a PRA system with a higher saving rate to both the paygo system and the PRA system with a
government guarantee.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the risk aspects of an investment-based defined contribution42This 7.5 percent is less than the real marginal product of capital because the state and
local governments also collect tax of one percent through property and profits taxes.
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Social Security plan.  We focus on the risks after the plan is fully phased in so that all employees
and retirees are participants in the plan. To be concrete, we base our calculations on the detailed
projections of economic and demographic variables by the Social Security Administration and
the Census Bureau for the 80 year period beginning in 1998.  We therefore  assume that the new
defined contribution program begins with the birth cohort that is 21 in 1998 and look at the
experience of the individuals of all cohorts who are alive in the year 2077.
In this plan, individuals are required to deposit a specified fraction of wages to a Personal
Retirement Account,  invest these funds in a 60:40 equity-debt mix, and receive a similarly
invested variable annuity at age 67.  The value of the assets in the Personal Retirement Accounts
follows a random walk with the mean and variance of a 60:40 equity-debt portfolio over the
period from 1946 to 1995,  a mean log return of 5.5 percent (net of administrative costs of 0.4
percent) and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent. We study stochastic distributions of this
process by doing 10,000 simulations of the 80 year experience from 1998 to 2077. We examine
also the implications of using federal corporate income tax collections of an additional 2.0
percent of assets, bringing the total available return to 7.5 percent.
42
The resulting annuities are compared to the future defined benefits promised in the
current Social Security law, a level that we refer to as the “benchmark” Social Security benefits. 
The Social Security actuaries calculate that the aging of the population and increased longevity
imply that the future Social Security payroll tax required to finance the benchmark benefits on a
pay-as-you-go basis would be greater than 18 percent. 46 May 1998
If the 5.5 percent mean log rate of return were known with certainty, individuals could
purchase the benchmark level of benefits by saving 3.1 percent of earnings, just one-sixth of the
required tax in the pay-as-you-go plan. But the uncertain nature of the rate of return implies that 
saving 3.1 percent of wages is likely to provide an annuity that is either less than or greater than
the benchmark benefits.  
Saving a higher share of wages provides a “cushion” that protects the individual from the
risk of an unacceptably low level of benefits. For example, an individual who saves 6 percent of
his earnings during his working years from 21 to 66 (with a 5.5 percent mean log return) has a 50
percent chance of receiving an annuity at age 67 that is at least 2.1 times the benchmark level of
Social Security benefits (and therefore about 70 percent of preretirement pretax wages) and only
a 17 percent chance that that annuity is less than benchmark Social Security benefit.  In 95
percent of the investment experience the annuity exceeds 61 percent of the benchmark benefit.
We also study a modified defined contribution plan in which retirees face no risk of
receiving less than the benchmark benefit because the government provides a conditional pension
transfer to any retiree whose annuity is less in any year than the benchmark level of benefits.  We
show that with a four percent saving rate and a 5.5 percent mean log rate of return, a conditional
transfer is required in only about half of the simulations.  The expected value of the transfers is
substantially less than the expected incremental corporate tax revenue that results from the
Personal Retirement Account saving.  In only about 15 percent of the simulations is it necessary
to use additional tax revenue to finance the transfers.  In 95 percent of simulations, the net
revenue required (in excess of the incremental corporate tax) would be less than 3.7 percent of
earnings, implying that the combination of PRA saving and the conditional transfer tax is still47 May 1998
less than half of the projected pay-as-you-go tax.
A pure defined contribution plan with a 6 percent saving rate invested in a 60:40 equity-
debt Personal Retirement Account can cut the individual’s cost of  providing a retirement annuity
to one-third of the projected 18 percent pay-as-you go tax while leaving the retiree exposed to
relatively little risk that the resulting annuity will be less than the benchmark level of Social
Security benefits projected in current law. Even this risk can be completely eliminated by a 
conditional government transfer from employees when the defined contribution annuities are less
than the benchmark benefits.  The risk to employees in this arrangement is extremely small,
again implying that a  defined contribution Social Security plan can achieve the benchmark level
of benefits with a much lower burden on employees and little or no risk to retirees. 
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